Ronald L. Berenstain Partner

In a decision with potentially far-reaching effects, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently toughened the standard for granting class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, No. 05-3349-cv (Dec. 5, 2006), the court reversed an order granting class certification in six consolidated securities fraud actions brought by thousands of investors against major investment banks alleging that they had inflated market prices and received secret commissions when underwriting IPOs. This decision may affect all areas of law influenced by class actions, including employment, antitrust, consumer protection and product liability.

The Department of Justice recently announced that it will revise some controversial policies outlined in a document known as the Thompson Memorandum. The new policies will place procedural limits on attempts by the Department of Justice to require companies under investigation to waive the attorney-client privilege. The policies will also bar federal prosecutors from considering as a factor in charging decisions whether a company is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or other corporate agents. These widely anticipated changes respond to strong criticism of the Thompson Memorandum from many sources and are designed to preempt legislation introduced by Arlen Specter, the outgoing chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

In a decision generally protective of directors and officers, a Seattle federal district court recently held that shareholders who seek to bring derivative claims under Washington law must meet requirements similar to those imposed under Delaware law. In re Cray, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (W.D. Wash. 2006).

In a significant decision favorable to defendants in securities fraud lawsuits, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006), the United States Supreme Court has unanimously decided to close a loophole that plaintiffs' lawyers have used to bring securities fraud lawsuits in state court. This loophole existed as a result of how some appellate courts had interpreted the language of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).

In recent years the SEC has dramatically increased the size of civil penalties it seeks from companies accused of violating the federal securities laws. Critics questioned the SEC's lack of standards for determining such penalties and argued that the SEC's approach simply heaped additional punishment on the very same shareholders who were victimized by the company's violations.

In the first case to directly address the question, a federal district court has held that private parties have no right to enforce Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Neer v. Pelino, No. 04-CV-04791-SD (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2005). Instead, the court held that only the SEC can enforce Section 304.

A judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently dismissed the SEC's first Regulation FD enforcement action to be tested in federal courts. In dismissing the action against Siebel Systems and two of its officers, the Court took the SEC to task for its overly aggressive enforcement of Regulation FD.

In early August 2005, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its opinion after a widely publicized three-month trial in In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, absolving Disney's directors of liability in connection with the 1995-1996 hiring and firing of former Disney president Michael Ovitz. Ovitz received a severance package of approximately $140 million after his unsuccessful 14-month tenure at Disney.

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court recently reversed Arthur Andersen's criminal conviction for violating a federal witness tampering statute by encouraging its employees to shred Enron documents pursuant to a document retention policy. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2005 WL 1262915 (U.S. May 31, 2005). In doing so, the Supreme Court avoided direct evaluation of the conduct that led to the accounting firm's conviction.

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently rejected as inadequate a proposed settlement in a derivative action brought against directors and officers of the Fairchild Corporation. This Update highlights the key issues in the Court's rejection and offers practical guidance.

The pattern is familiar. A public company makes some positive announcements about a product. After some time passes, the company announces bad news about the product, leading to a decline in the stock price.

New York Stock Exchange listing standards require boards of listed companies to conduct self‑evaluations at least annually to determine whether the board and its committees are functioning effectively. Although Nasdaq Marketplace Rules are silent on board self‑evaluations, a growing number of companies are considering such evaluations as a matter of best practices.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent changes in Securities and Exchange Commission and stock exchange requirements have imposed ever greater responsibilities on corporate directors. As these additional responsibilities expose directors to increasing risks, companies have struggled to attract and retain qualified candidates to serve as independent directors.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 established a safe harbor for forward-looking statements. A company cannot be liable for making a forward-looking statement if, among other factors, the statement "is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement."

In recent years there has been an upsurge in the number of stockholder derivative lawsuits. This type of lawsuit differs fundamentally from a securities class action.

On January 23, 2004, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery held that eBay directors may be liable for usurping a corporate opportunity. In this derivative action, eBay shareholders allege that certain of eBay's directors improperly received allocations of shares in hot IPOs being underwritten by Goldman Sachs in order to induce such eBay directors to steer business to Goldman Sachs.

The stock market bubble and crash from 1998 to 2001 and the ongoing stream of corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco have put corporate governance under the microscope. The actions of business leaders are now at the lowest levels of trust and highest levels of scrutiny in recent memory.